2. Harmony and Division in Ancient Greek Thought
2.1 Plato, Republic
About This Text
Though more formal theorizing about the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers will emerge in early modern European thought, questions about harmony, unity and division in political life go back to ancient Athens in the 5th century B.C.E. Here, then, we turn to excerpts from Plato’s Republic. The Republic reports a conversation between Socrates and several of his young followers (including Plato’s brothers) as the group searches for an understanding of justice. To understand justice in the individual soul, Socrates argues, we must first understand justice in the city. In the passage below, Socrates describes justice as a proper ordering of the city, in which every group in the city performs its proper task and only its proper task. Plato, that is, sees justice as involving a division of civic and political labor. Note, though, that far from involving conflict or competition, this kind of division produces perfect harmony in the just city.
Plato
excerpts from Republic (source)
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Book IV
Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.
What do you mean?
I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her.
I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.
Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, “one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted” that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Quick Explainer
Plato here reminds the reader that early in the process of describing the perfectly good and just city, Socrates and his friends had introduced the ideas of division of labor and specializations. What started as a way to ensure that the city had all the material goods it required now becomes the foundation of justice in the city.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one’s own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.
Yes, we said so.
Then to do one’s own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I cannot, but I should like to be told.
Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.
That follows of necessity.
If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?
Exactly.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?
Certainly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another’s, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him? “Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him?”
Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?
Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one’s own city would be termed by you injustice?
Certainly.
“when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just”This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.
I agree with you.
Stop & Think
Plato argues here that varying human abilities and talents require a sharp division of labor, not only economically but socially and politically as well. To stray from this proper division of labor would be unjust. What do you think is the strongest counterargument to the claims Plato makes about justice in the passage? What assumptions about human nature does Plato make and how might a critic of Plato’s respond? What might be an argument for justice that rejects a social and political division of labor?