7 The Center System and the Scope Reduction Report, 1975-1978

Escalating oil prices compelled the Governor to immediately adjust the state budget. Just three weeks after his reelection, in November 1974, Lucey sent a letter to all state departments instructing them to save one percent of their 1974 fiscal year budget in the next seven months. The Governor also issued specific directives to freeze hiring, to curtail state employees’ travel, to ban new consultancy contracts, to reduce printing expenses, and to sharply cut back overtime expenditures. The University’s central administration quickly decided to prorate the burden among all the System’s institutions. The Center System’s share was $98,379. When Chancellor Fort relayed this discouraging news to the deans, he noted with alarm that this sum would be added to the Regents-required productivity savings of $140,000 for fiscal year 1974.^[1]

A short time later, Regent President Frank Pelisek received more bad news from the Governor. Lucey began his letter by reminding the Regents of the great commitment Wisconsin taxpayers had made and sustained over many decades to assure both broad access to the University and the high quality of its programs. He underscored this point by observing that Wisconsin’s per capita support of the UW ranked third in the nation, despite her 27th rank in per capita income. Then, he flatly stated that this level of support could not continue in these severe economic times. Specifically, Lucey informed Pelisek that, in the 1975-1977 budget, there would be no increase for supplies and expenses (S&E); a reduction in the amount of state dollars for support services, computing services, and instructional supplies; and no additional state dollars to accommodate any increased enrollment. He suggested the faculty’s workload be increased to absorb additional students. The Governor closed his letter by admonishing the University of Wisconsin to maintain the high quality of its educational programs as it planned how to meet these budget constraints. Accordingly, to meet this challenge, he directed the Board of Regents to provide to him, by April 15, 1975, a plan for “phasing out, phasing down, or consolidating existing centers, campuses, colleges, and programs of the System.” Thus began what quickly became known as the “scope reduction study.”^[2]

Shortly thereafter, on January 19, 1975, The Milwaukee Journal Sunday edition carried a long article that summarized the findings of budget analysts in the Department of Administration (DOA). Among DOA’s recommendations were several directly affecting the Center System: 1) closure of the Medford and Richland campuses; 2) transfer of seven Centers (Baraboo, Barron County, Fond du Lac, Manitowoc, Marinette, Marshfield, Washington County) to the VTAE System and reduction of their state support to the VTAE average of $750.00 per student, and 3) transfer of control over four Centers to nearby four-year University of Wisconsin institutions (Fox Valley and Sheboygan to UW-Oshkosh, Marathon to UW-Stevens Point, and Rock County to UW-Whitewater). Consequently, only the Waukesha Center would remain an independent two-year campus, and even it would be constrained to operate within a budget pegged at the average per student cost for Level 1 instruction (freshman-sophomore courses) of the University Cluster. This restriction promised to slash Waukesha’s budget by approximately $300.00 per FTE student, a 15% reduction.^[3]

The DOA claimed that the state would save about $3.3 million during the 1975-77 biennium if the governor and legislature implemented all of its recommendations. However, it acknowledged that the savings could be reduced by $150,000, if the state had to assume the debt service for the Taylor and Richland County construction bonds; and, in the worst case scenario, if the state was required to repay entirely the grants obtained from the federal government for these facilities, the savings would drop to a meager $210,000.

The DOA study also admitted that the transfer of seven Centers to the VTAE System could occur only if some very knotty issues could be resolved. One of those questions involved the VTAE System’s lack of enthusiasm for more college parallel programs; the issue was certain to arise because merger was likely to touch off a struggle for control in each new dual-track institution between the academic and the vocational-technical personnel. Another large obstacle was the cost of accommodating those tenured Center System faculty who refused voluntarily to transfer to the VTAE schools. Moreover, the DOA estimate failed to assess the negative economic impact of closing Medford and Richland upon their host communities or upon families who would now have to send their students to another UW institution.

The authors of this study contended that, “It [economic impact] is a consideration that should really not play a part in determining what the educational value of a campus is.” They argued that the University had overbuilt during the sixties and that the location of some of the Centers appeared to be the result of political trade-offs between the WSU and UW Systems, without regard for economic and educational necessity. The evidence of the political struggles between the WSU and UW Systems in the 1960s, as described in Chapter Five, to gain control over as much of Wisconsin higher education as possible supports the DOA Study’s conclusion. However, its hard-hearted dismissal of the adverse economic impact upon a community whose UW Center campus would be closed appears in sharp contrast to state government’s willingness to assist private businesses to continue operations so that the state could avoid the much higher costs of assisting a community which lost an important employer.

The DOA study also made recommendations about three smaller baccalaureate institutions–Platteville, River Falls, and Superior. These four-year campuses had been singled out because their current and projected enrollments for the early 1980s would remain under the 5,000 FTE students required to be cost effective. However, these institutions were to be closed only as a last resort; first, the UW could phase out any under-enrolled majors and eliminate departments and colleges to bring costs under control. The study also suggested that System Administrators discuss with University of Minnesota officials a possible merger of Superior and River Falls with the Minnesota campuses at Duluth and Minneapolis, respectively.

Once the press corps learned of the DOA report, they rushed to the governor’s office to ask about his view of its recommendations. They were aware that the governor had received the report about five weeks before he sent his letter to Regent President Pelisek and they wanted to know whether he had used it in drafting his November directive to the University, and whether he would preempt the Regents’ deliberations by including any of the DOA’s proposals in his 1975-1977 budget. Robert Dunn, the Governor’s executive secretary, explained that Lucey had not yet read the report and that the Governor would await the University’s report before drawing any conclusions about closing campuses. Lucey’s press secretary, Jeff Smoller, reiterated this point by saying, “Lucey will not recommend any campus closings in his budget bill.”^[4]

Reporters also sought reactions from various University officials. Regent Vice President Bertram McNamara labelled the suggestion that Medford and Richland be shut down as a “trial balloon.” McNamara disputed the DOA’s estimate of the savings from closing these campuses, noting that it omitted costs that would inevitably continue, such as state support for Medford and Richland students who enrolled elsewhere and the salaries of faculty who transferred to other System campuses. Senior Vice President Donald Smith sharply criticized DOA’s decision to ignore economic impact in its calculations. Smith also predicted it would be six to eight years before any savings would be realized, concluding that, “[The] projected savings in this biennium are pure fiction.” Chancellor Fort echoed these observations. He added that even if the entire $3.3 million could be captured in fiscal 1976, the net savings would be a minuscule .006% of the annual $495 million UW System budget. Fort especially disagreed with DOA’s suggestion that seven Centers could be easily transferred to the VTAE System. He cited his knowledge of California’s junior colleges, which were the scene of expensive, ongoing power struggles between the academic and vocational-technical faculties. Indeed, Fort predicted that such a merger would actually result in higher costs.^[5]

Roger Gribble, education reporter for the The Wisconsin State Journal, sought out reactions to the possible closing of the Richland Campus. Richland’s Dean, Marjorie Wallace, related that about seventy citizens had gathered on the campus the day after the story broke to develop a strategy to “shoot down the DOA trial balloon.” Asked to comment on the subject, Wallace insisted that a merger of Centers with VTAE schools would not save the taxpayers’ money because the VTAE System per student cost of $2,040 was higher than the Center System average of $1,964 per FTE student. A merger would merely shift expenses from the state budget to the property taxpayers of the vocational-technical school districts. Richland’s State Representative Joanne Duren (D-Cazenovia) and State Senator Kathryn Morrison (D-Platteville) pledged strong support to keep Richland open. Duren emphasized that this Center provided access to public higher education for people who otherwise would not have an opportunity to take college courses. Richland County Board Chairman Foster Patch bluntly promised, “‘there’ll be a battle’ if the legislature actually receives a proposal to shut down the Center.”^[6]

While the public reactions of UW System administrators to the DOA study were politely critical, such was not the case within the confines of the System offices in Madison’s Van Hise Hall. There, UW System staff members Elwin Cammack, Gene Arnn, and Jim Kolka drafted “Alternatives for Dealing With the Problem of Underutilized Center System and University Campuses.” This hard-hitting critique blasted the unwarranted assumptions, the overblown estimates of savings, and the anti-UW tenor of the DOA paper–a paper these men labelled a “polemic.” They contended that DOA’s budget people displayed a bias toward a “quick fix” budget cut that required very drastic measures to achieve a very modest reduction in the state’s general public revenue (GPR) support of the University System. Indeed, Cammack, Arnn, and Kolka stressed that the estimated savings from campus closings were inflated primarily because closing and transition expenses had not been taken into account. For example, no attempt was made to calculate the increased cost to UW-Madison’s engineering department should Platteville be eliminated, thus forcing its engineering students onto the Madison campus. The DOA estimates also conveniently overlooked the fact that tenured faculty contracts required a one year notice of a layoff, so even if a Center or a Campus could be quickly closed down, the obligation to continue faculty and other salaries would almost wipe out the short term savings. This document challenged each of the DOA’s calculations and conclusions and raised important policy questions.^[7]

During its January 1975 meeting, the Board of Regents unanimously directed President Weaver to appoint and convene a System Advisory Planning Task Force to “define those actions which, by reducing the size of the System, would help to generate over the next four to six years the resources needed to maintain the quality and health of the System as it would then be organized.”^[8] The Task Force would need to work quickly to meet Governor Lucey’s mid-April deadline. Within two weeks Weaver announced that he had chosen 29 administrators, faculty, and students to be members of the Task Force and that he had selected Senior Vice President Donald Smith to chair the group. From the Center System, Chancellor Fort and Assistant Professor Veldor Kopitzke (Business Administration/Economics, Fox Valley) were appointed. Wilson Thiede, Provost for University Outreach, whose domain included UW Extension and the Center System was also named to the group. During its initial meeting the Task Force divided itself into four study groups, each of which was assigned the task of examining a particular perspective: Committee 1–Phase out of universities and centers; Committee 2–Phase down of institutions through phase out of schools and colleges; Committee 3–Phase out, phase down or consolidation of academic or support programs; and Committee 4–Alternative approaches to planning for the 1980s.

Each study committee was directed to consider several factors in its deliberations, such as the correlation between a campus’s current enrollment and its projected 1984 enrollment, the number of UW institutions in a service area, the ratio of current and projected enrollment to campus capacity, and, of course, the average cost per student.^[9] Even before the Task Force was appointed, President Weaver had attempted to reassure the chancellors that the Task Force would not, itself, decide what ought to be closed or scaled down, but rather would develop criteria to use in reaching such decisions and would run simulations in an attempt to predict the consequences of applying those criteria.^[10]

Committee 4, responsible for suggesting “Alternate approaches to planning for the 1980s,” ran a simulation to determine the potential savings if the Marathon County, Marshfield/Wood County, and Medford Centers were consolidated with the UW-Stevens Point. The logic behind this particular simulation was that these three Centers were within 35 miles of one another and two of them (Marathon and Marshfield) were not much farther from Stevens Point. Using Fall 1973 enrollment data for the three Centers and Stevens Point’s formula for allocating a full time faculty position, the model suggested that 54 FTE faculty would be sufficient to staff the classes at the Centers, a reduction of 18 faculty. This would generate a savings of $216,000 ($12,000 average x 18). The simulation also calculated savings from transferring most of the administrative functions from Marathon, Marshfield, and Medford to Stevens Point at $89,000 (reduction of 7 FTE administrators), to produce a total potential saving of $305,000.^[11]

In addition to stressing the relative proximity of the four campuses, the study group noted that projections for the 1980s indicated that the enrollment at all four would decline. Thus, this simulation suggested a solution that would help the three Center System campuses and UW-Stevens Point. At the same time, the Committee admitted the Centers’ students would experience some disadvantages. Obviously, these students would have little direct access to student services, especially counseling, business office operations or the commuting faculty. In fact, the Committee speculated that the Medford resident faculty could eventually be entirely phased out, so those students would have no full time university personnel on campus to assist them. Finally, it was noted that there would be a short term workload increase for Stevens Point personnel, but that would be resolved in the early eighties, when the projected enrollment decline began.^[12]

Responding to an invitation for comments, Medford Dean Darwin Slocum, whose campus had been a branch of UW-Stevens Point until the merger, indicated that he and his faculty and staff did not desire to renew that relationship. Since merger, Medford’s course offerings had been broadened to enable her students to transfer readily anywhere in the UW System, rather than being funneled primarily to the Stevens Point Campus. Slocum also told the Committee that the Center System’s greatest strength arose from the varied backgrounds of the personnel of the 14 Centers, whose talents could be pooled to solve problems. Chancellor Fort echoed Slocum’s comments and predicted that the proposed elimination of virtually all student services personnel from the three Centers would mean rapidly declining enrollment because students, particularly freshmen, needed readily accessible advising and counseling services. Fort also asserted that the expenses necessary to maintain a commuting faculty (one-fourth release time and travel reimbursement), would consume a significant amount of the estimated savings. The Chancellor passed along the Marathon Center’s concern that its enrollment would drop precipitously when its curriculum became geared to Stevens Point’s course offerings, because Marathon had traditionally stressed transferring students to UW-Madison. In conclusion, Fort stated that this plan would do serious harm to the Center System, while producing very little monetary savings for the University System and the state.^[13]

Committee 1 of the Task Force had the assignment to study “phase out of universities and centers” that elicited the most widespread fear throughout the University of Wisconsin System. Four University Cluster campuses–Green Bay, Platteville, River Falls, Superior–and five Centers–Baraboo/Sauk County, Barron County, Marinette, Medford, Richland–were chosen for this simulation because of their low enrollment, high cost per student, projected enrollment decline, and geographical proximity to another UW institution. This lengthy “hit list” caused so much alarm and rumor-spreading that System Vice President Donald Smith felt compelled to write all the chancellors to remind them that this was just a study of options and that “no prior judgements have been made about when any closings may actually occur.” Smith urged the chancellors to stress this point in the midst of “all the inevitable rumors.”^[14]

A lengthy list of questions was considered in simulating the elimination of each Center. These questions were arranged in four broad categories: Educational Consequences, Human Consequences, Fiscal Consequences, and Economic Consequences. The educational consequences of closing the five Centers would be minimal because students could enroll in similar freshman and sophomore courses elsewhere in the UW; however, the communities would be deprived of the cultural and social activities these Centers provided. The assessment of the human consequences produced sharply contrasting results. While most students, it was believed, could pursue their educational goals elsewhere, the employment outlook for the faculty and staff was bleak. There was a surplus of university teachers nationwide, and the local economies provided few job opportunities that would match the salaries staff persons presently received. The examination of the fiscal consequences naturally focused upon potential savings of state revenue. But this, too, was a complicated calculation, for the simulation model had to reduce savings by the cost of educating each student who enrolled in another UW institution, the expense of terminating tenured faculty, the salary of any faculty who found a position elsewhere in the UW, and any federal grant funds the state might have to repay. The economic consequences, ultimately, were not calculated because it took longer than anticipated for the state Department of Administration and the UW System staff to produce the data.^[15]

Using Fall 1974 student data, Committee 1 discovered that each Center served primarily a very local clientele, for almost 80% of these five campuses’ students lived within a 25 mile radius of the Center. This data also revealed that almost two-thirds of the students were recent high school graduates, while the remainder were over age 21. Medford deviated from this pattern because it drew about half of its scholars from the non-traditional pool. Medford used this figure as evidence that it provided vital access to the UW for many Taylor County citizens. These statistics These statistics failed to address the key question: how much money could Wisconsin save by closing these five Centers? The model estimated the savings at various points in time–the Centers being closed immediately (1975), in 1980, in 1986, and in 1992. The latter three calculations were founded upon enrollment projections. The largest sum, almost $610,000, would be gained if all five were closed immediately and if, as the statisticians assumed, 80% of the non-traditional students did not enroll in another UW institution. As is evident in the accompanying chart, the projected savings declined after 1975 Moreover, if all the Centers’ students continued their education in the University of Wisconsin, the state would have to pay an additional $437,000 to accommodate them.^[16]

Data From Simulation of Closing Five Centers

* Based on Fall 1974 student data, % do not total 100% exactly.
Source: Book I. Report of the system Advisory Task Force, March 1975. Chapter IV: Summaries of Simulation Studies, pp. 58-114.

In mid March 1975, the System Advisory Planning Task Force transmitted its findings to President Weaver, who circulated drafts of the report to his staff in Van Hise Hall, asking for their comments and advice. Most noteworthy were Steve Bennion’s observations to Vice President Donald Percy. Bennion contended the Centers were not “Launched with the idea that their instructional costs would approximate” those of the smaller four-year campuses. As proof, Bennion cited the Board of Regents’ pre-merger decision in the 1960s to keep the Centers’ tuition below that charged of either UW-Green Bay or UW-Parkside. This policy, which had been continued since the merger, suggested that access was the “major intent in building the Centers to expand educational opportunity throughout the state.” Bennion remarked that the Center System already was making its salary dollars go farther by keeping a much greater percentage of its faculty at the instructor and assistant professor ranks, compared to the University Cluster. He also observed that the Centers could not squeeze more dollars from its instructional program without calling into question the quality of the curriculum. He concluded by noting that the Centers were worn out from all the scrutiny that had been focused upon them since the late 1960s; it was time to leave them alone or make a straight-forward recommendation to close the two or three smallest Centers.^[17] John Weaver presented his “Scope Reduction Report” to a special meeting of the Board of Regents on April 18, 1975. Seating space in the Board Room, on the 17th floor of Van Hise Hall, was at a premium because members of the press and keenly interested administrators and faculty representatives had flocked to the meeting. The President began by dramatically describing the UW’s dilemma–how to balance the tension between budget, quality, and access, so that the Wisconsin Idea could continue to thrive. He observed that Governor Lucey had admonished the UW not to expect any increase in state GPR support during the 1975-1977 biennium. Indeed, the UW was being asked to reduce its budget request by almost $10 million and to absorb a predicted $19 million in inflationary price increases during the upcoming biennium. Given those fiscal facts, he questioned how the University could absorb the predicted additional 6,000 students and reduce its expenses without harming the quality of the academic program. Weaver believed that access to the UW would have to be scaled down by raising admission standards, capping enrollments, or closing some campuses or Centers. For the University to accept more students without an increase in state resources, Weaver thought, was “an inescapable prescription for irreversible mediocrity.”^[18]

Weaver then turned to the closure simulations that had been conducted. The trial runs clearly indicated that substantial savings would be realized only if a closure was accompanied by a limit on enrollment. If a substantial number of students from a closed campus enrolled elsewhere, almost no savings would be realized. In addition to less access to the UW, a closing also meant a loss to the host community in intellectual, cultural, recreational, and economic benefits. Weaver reiterated his plea that state government find a way to stabilize the System budget, so that citizens’ access to higher education and the high quality of the UW’s academic programs could be maintained.^[19]

Weaver then presented his “decision agenda for Wisconsin state government”–an agenda that contained just two options. State government, Weaver said, had to choose between A) ordering the University of Wisconsin System immediately to begin to reduce its scope and to limit access or B) allowing the Board of Regents to continue its “current planning approach to accommodating an uncertain future.” If Option A were selected, Weaver suggested the state could direct the Board to phase out up to three Centers (Baraboo, Medford, Richland) by 1977, or to mandate an alternate use for those Centers, such as having UW-Extension establish a “life-long learning center” at each campus. Secondly, by 1979, selected four-year campuses would be closed and, finally, by 1981, the University’s budget would be reduced to reflect the savings. The President added the ominous observation that, if any four-year campuses were to be shut down, all of the nearby Centers ought to be closed first in an effort to shunt sufficient enrollment to that institution to permit it to survive. If the governor and legislature selected Option B, then Weaver pledged the continuation of the systemwide “program audit and review” process to eliminate unwarranted duplication of academic majors.^[20]

Having placed the current three smallest Centers on the table as possible candidates for closure or mission redefinition, President Weaver spelled out the criteria to be used to decide whether a particular Center needed “special scrutiny.” Weaver suggested that no course of action be chosen until meetings had been held with the Center’s faculty, staff, and community members, and an open hearing had taken place. Then, the Board would make its decision and spell out the legal and policy steps required to implement its decision. If the recommendation was to shut down a Center, all this information would be passed on to the governor and legislature, who would make the final decision.^[21]

Because the Center System had loomed so large in the Task Force’s work and in the President’s Report, Chancellor Fort was invited to address the Regents. He questioned the Department of Administration’s predictions that the current economic doldrums would continue for several years and that the UW’s enrollment would decline sharply in the 1980s. Fort observed that the enrollment of significant numbers of older students was already making earlier projections inaccurate. From a historical point of view, Fort asserted that the Centers had been founded with the idea that they would not be as cost effective as a larger institution, but rather their purposes were to provide, at relatively low cost, greater access to the University, a smaller class size, and a personalized education. Fort reminded his listeners that closing small Centers would generate only negligible, or, probably, no savings. He called upon state government to renew its support of the Wisconsin Idea and to provide the University System with adequate resources.^[22]

After considerable discussion, the Board of Regents unanimously adopted Weaver’s Report as its plan of action.^[23] Thus, the smaller Centers would have to at least avoid the “tripwire” which stipulated that if any Center’s cost-per-student exceeded the Center System average by 20% or more for two consecutive years, it would be given special scrutiny to determine whether closure was warranted. And it appeared that the entire Center System might be heading into dark days, depending upon the directives included in the 1975-77 Biennial Budget bill.

Now the focus of attention shifted to the State Capitol at the other end of State Street. In his letter of transmittal, Regent President Frank J. Pelisek emphasized the most prominent conclusion drawn from the Task Force’s data, “. . . a decision to close down a particular campus will not produce major dollar savings,” unless the state, at the same time, releases the System from any obligations to accommodate the displaced faculty and students.. ^[24] When reporters queried Democrat Senator William Bablitch (Stevens Point), a co-chairman of the powerful Joint Finance Committee, about his reaction to the Regents' recommendations, he said that campus closings should not be included in the budget bill, so that this important issue could receive the intense study it deserved.^[25] However, a few days later Department of Administration Secretary Anthony Earl told the press that he was trying to find a Democrat legislator who would move to insert just that provision into the budget bill. Earl believed the Regents should be granted the authority to close Centers without legislative approval. He added the observation that the ". . . Centers at Medford, Baraboo, and Richland Center are thought to be expendable."^[26]

Most of the attention, quite naturally, concentrated upon the deliberations of the Joint Finance Committee, to which the majority Democrats looked for guidance on the biennial budget. On the second of May, the JFC reached consensus on a three-point resolution addressed to the Board of Regents, which included a directive to the Regents to "Proceed during 1975-77 with the development of plans to phase out or otherwise change the use of Centers failing to meet performance criteria set by the Regents." The Board was further instructed to send a progress report on its development of these plans to the Legislature by October 15, 1975.^[27] The next three weeks were filled with maneuvers by various factions concerned with the Centers' future. In the end, the Assembly passed a resolution, sponsored by state Representatives Joanne Duren (D-Cazenovia), Michael Farrell (D-Racine), and Norman Anderson (D-Madison), which deleted campus closings or phase downs from the budget bill.^[28] Nonetheless, the Center System, and especially the Baraboo, Medford, and Richland campuses, remained under heavy scrutiny, as the System administrators and Board of Regents tried to figure out how best to manage the University's resources.

Ironically, the Center System, as an institution, had made good progress toward reducing its cost-per-student or CSI. The composite support index (CSI) was a formula developed by UW System to compare the cost-per-student among UW institutions. The CSI included the cost of instruction; the supplies and expenses (S&E); the cost of support services such as admissions, advising, and other student services; and administrative overhead; all calculated on a per student basis. The cost cutting measures introduced by Chancellor Adolfson and Vice Chancellor Long in the early 1970s had been continued after the merger. Consequently, in just one year, 1973-74, the Centers had lowered its CSI by $100.00 per student.^[29] This was very impressive, since it had been accomplished in the midst of an inflationary economy.

But what was an appropriate CSI for the Center System? This question had puzzled System Administration ever since merger. One large problem was that there was no exactly comparable institution in the entire United States, against which the Centers could be measured. After a good deal of investigation, System Administration decided, in summer 1975, to compare Center System costs to those of six sets of two-year institutions that seemed "most comparable."^[30] In November 1975, a progress report to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau on the Center System noted that its cost-per-student was within $15.00 of the average for these six institutions. Furthermore, it appeared that by 1976-1977, the Centers' collective CSI would be below this average, because the comparable budgets were rising, while the Center System continued to trim its operating costs. Consequently, the progress report urged the LFB not to conduct further studies of the Centers, because the negative publicity that accompanied such scrutiny hurt morale and, more importantly, dissuaded students from enrolling at a Center undergoing scrutiny.^[31]

However, it was too late to ask state government to take the spotlight off the Center System because the smallest Centers had already been caught in its glare. And the Board of Regents kept them there, as it followed up on the Scope Reduction Report. Even if the Center System's fiscal health was improving, serious questions still remained about Medford, Richland, and Baraboo. In July 1975, Chancellor Fort reported to Senior Vice President Donald Smith that his and Outreach Provost Wilson Thiede's assessment was that Baraboo and Richland would be able to meet both of the Regents' criteria--at least 250 FTE and costs no more than 20% above the Center System CSI--but that Medford would never achieve the mandated minimum enrollment. Thus, Fort suggested that he and the System administrators meet to explore the options which might be exercised in Medford's case.^[32]

That meeting produced five options. For example, the Medford campus could be turned over to UW-Extension to be operated as a "Northwest Wisconsin Continuing Education Center." As an alternative, Medford could be eliminated. Another possibility was to transfer the facilities to the North Central Technical Institute, located in Wausau.^[33] The fourth option would reduce Medford to a "freshman Center," similar to the earliest Extension Centers of the 1930s and 1940s. The final alternative would have reattached Medford to UW-Stevens Point, which could hopefully provide needed administrative and student services to Medford's students without adding significantly to its own costs.^[34]

The preliminary Fall 1975 enrollment figures revealed the welcome news that the Center System had about 800 more students, a ten percent increase, compared to the previous fall. But, this increase was unevenly distributed among the fourteen campuses. Tiny Medford had 187 students (118 FTE), its second highest enrollment ever. Despite this, Medford still needed to reduce its budget by $26,000 to bring the cost-per-student within the +20% criteria. Baraboo's enrollment had shot up by 120, a 38% increase which removed that campus from the special review list. But Richland's student body plummeted by 15% (48 fewer students), causing its budget reduction to more than triple, from $23,000 to $76,000.^[35] Richland reported that it had contacted 52 students who had preregistered but who did not actually enroll. This survey demonstrated that most of them had been "scared away" from Richland by the negative publicity about the campus possibly being closed.^[36]

Throughout the Fall 1975 semester, Chancellor Fort and Provost Thiede worked with President Weaver's staff to find the dollars that Medford and Richland needed to refund. They tried hard to leave the instructional budget intact but in the end had to take $10,000 from Medford's and $29,000 from Richland's. The results of these deliberations were forwarded to the Regents for their action

in January 1976. Provost Thiede, in his address to the Board members, noted that a slight decrease in enrollment at a small Center resulted in a huge increase in its CSI. For example, Richland's 15% enrollment decline had caused its per-student-cost to jump more than 30%. On the other hand, Baraboo's handsome enrollment increase had diminished its CSI to very near the Center System average. Thiede urged the Regents to relieve the Center System from making annual budget adjustments, because annual changes to dollars and personnel were difficult to quickly accomplish.

Chancellor Fort echoed the Provost's remarks, then presented a broader perspective on the Center System's dilemma. Fort contended that, because an "averaging down" was underway, even a Center whose enrollment rose modestly might find itself in fiscal difficulty. Closing a high cost, small Center would not solve this problem, Fort noted, because there inevitably would be another Center to take its place on the "chopping block." The Chancellor then questioned the validity of the 250 FTE figure, which the Regents had decreed was the minimum number of students needed for a Center to sustain a curriculum broad enough to guarantee completion of an associate degree in four semesters. Fort announced that he had appointed a Basic Curricular Program Task Force, which would investigate the issue and report in May 1976 the minimum array of liberal arts courses a Center needed to offer over two academic years to enable students to earn an associate degree. Fort suggested that this "minimum module" or core curriculum might be an acceptable alternative to the 250 FTE tripwire. If so, perhaps even Medford could be maintained as a UW Center.^[37]

After hearing the speakers' comments, the Regents debated the requirement that Medford and Richland fully repay their debts by July 1, 1976. Several Regents expressed sympathy for these Centers' plight. Ody Fish argued that the Regents' criteria were too rigid and that they must remember the UW's partnership with the communities in which Centers were located. That partnership ought not be dissolved, he argued, except for the most critical reasons and the current circumstances did not constitute a crisis. John Levine observed that, since the Scope Reduction Task Force data indicated it would cost the state more to accommodate a closed Center's students elsewhere in the System, it made no sense to him to "spend money to close campuses." Gradually a consensus emerged around a resolution suggested by Regent Joyce Erdman that suspended the budgetary axe that hung over Richland and Medford. The Regents agreed to await the report of the Basic Curricular Program Task Force before taking further action. In the meantime both campuses were admonished to continue their efforts to bring their CSI within 20% of the Center System's average.^[38]

CENTER SYSTEM ENROLLMENT (Headcount and Percent Change)

Source: The University of Wisconsin System Student Statistics--Term 1, 1981-82 Undergraduate Enrollment with 10-Year Profile (March 9, 1982)

The Basic Curricular Program Task Force produced a Liberal Arts Core Curriculum (see below), consisting of forty-six courses drawn from all academic disciplines. Each Center was permitted to add courses to this bare minimum as its budget allowed. In addition, each Center was directed to develop and publish a four semester sequence of courses to be used in advising students.^[39] The recommendations of the Task Force were forwarded to the Center System Senate in Fall 1976, discussed thoroughly by the local collegia, and ultimately ratified by the Senate in January 1977.^[40] With the Senate's approval in hand, Chancellor Fort forwarded the Liberal Arts Core Curriculum to the Board of Regents in February 1977. In his report he recounted how the core curriculum had been developed, noting that all fourteen Centers would be able to comply with it and also remain within the Regents' cost guidelines. He described it as a "living document," one which would be reviewed annually and adjusted to meet students' needs. Fort told the Regents that the core curriculum should now be substituted for the 250 FTE enrollment criterion for the minimal size of a Center campus.^[41]

In March 1977, Chancellor Fort presented his 1976 Annual Report to the Board of Regents. There was much good news to report, especially concerning finances. Fort underscored that the Center System CSI now stood at just 10% above the University Cluster average. The Centers had enrolled 6.2% of the University's total enrollment but expended only 3.5% of its GPR budget. Further, more of the individual campus CSIs had been compressed toward the average through reallocation. The range had been reduced from more than 20% above the average at the time of merger to about 9% during the 1976-1977 fiscal year.

In addition, the Chancellor reported that the Center System had a new constitution, which replaced former Chancellor Long's much maligned Charter, and that the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools visitation committee had unanimously awarded the institution ten years accreditation as a "separate unit of the University of Wisconsin System."^[42]

The drafting of a new constitution had actually begun in October 1974 when Acting Chancellor Meggers appointed a ten-member Charter Review Committee. The revised constitution had to win three separate votes to be adopted. First, the Collegium needed to initiate the approval process by a two-thirds vote, then ten of the fourteen local collegia needed to give their assent and, finally, the Collegium needed to ratify it by another two-thirds margin.^[43]

While the Charter Review committee was organizing its work, an important debate and vote took place in the Collegium concerning a vital constitutional issue. Both the recently enacted merger law (Chapter 36: University of Wisconsin System) and the Board of Regents' Faculty Personnel Rules, which were solidly based on Chapter 36, mandated that the faculty be given the primary responsibility for making personnel decisions and determining the curriculum. This responsibility was to be exercised through the appropriate "academic department or its funcional equivalent." The "functional equivalent" phrase recognized that both the Center System and UW-Extension were not single-site institutions where the faculty could conveniently gather to deliberate and make personnel and curriculum decisions.^[44]

Liberal Arts Core Curriculum

Each campus must be able to offer, within a two-year period, the following distribution of courses as a minimum.

In Mathematics and Natural Sciences

Twelve courses, representing each of the following subject areas:

Biology

Chemistry

Physics

Math, Pre-Calculus and Calculus

Physical Geography or Geology

In Humanities

Twelve courses, representing each of the following subject areas:

English (Literature)

Art (not applied)

Music (not applied or performing)

Philosophy

Communication Arts

Foreign Language

In Social Sciences

Twelve courses, representing each of the following subject areas:

Economics

History

Psychology

Sociology

Anthropology

Political Science

Cultural Geography

Among Non-Distributive Courses

Ten courses, representing each of the following offerings:

English (Writing Courses)

Applied Music Courses

Performing Music Courses

Studio Art Courses

Performing Drama Courses

Applied Journalism Courses

Activity Courses in Physical Education

Professional Courses in Physical Education

Courses for the Underprepared Student as Appropriate

Source: Chancellor Edward B. Fort, Report on the Liberal Arts Core Curriculum, February 1977.

On November 14, 1974, the Collegium convened in a special session to determine the Centers' functional equivalent. University of Wisconsin System Legal Counsel John Tallman addressed the delegates, laying out the legal requirements of the merger law and faculty personnel rules. Then each senator had an opportunity to describe the stance of his or her constituency. After considerable debate of a resolution which would have designated the academic departments as the functional equivalent, the Collegium convincingly voted it down, 4-yes to 18-no. Next, a proposal specifying, "the local Center Collegium, through its committees," as the functional equivalent was debated. The senators ultimately passed this motion, 15 to 6.^[45]

The simple report of the votes, of course, understates the strong emotions expressed in the debate. The lines drawn in this meeting held throughout the entire constitution-writing process. On one side stood the faculties of the four former WSU branch campuses--Barron, Fond du Lac, Medford, and Richland. They resolutely resisted having the ultimate control over personnel decisions taken from the local appointments and evaluation committees, where Long's Charter had placed it. Their opposition also arose from these campuses' pre-merger history; they had traditionally made these decisions themselves. In addition, anxiety stemmed from worry about how they might be treated by the academic departments. A few key faculty members from the original UW Centers had expressed misgivings about the professional qualifications of the former Wisconsin State University faculty members, because they believed the WSU appointees had not been subjected to rigorous academic department scrutiny, such as they had received from the UW-Madison departments.

The faculty senators from these four Centers had been joined in crucial votes by the academic staff and student senators. The academic staff representatives' opposition arose from the fear that they would lose their voting rights in the new constitution, although the librarians and student services directors would continue to elect delegates. The five student senators apparently had been won over by the comments made by the faculty senators from Barron, Fond du Lac, Medford, and Richland and by the concerns expressed by the two academic staff senators.^[46]

On the other side stood those faculty members who wished to return control to the academic departments. Led, especially, by persons from Fox Valley, Marathon, Washington, and Waukesha, they lobbied the Charter Review Committee to ignore the Collegium vote and to restore the primary power over personnel decisions to the departments. This faction was also upset at the fact that Long's Charter permitted non-faculty senators to vote upon issues which exclusively concerned the faculty.^[47]

Meanwhile, the Charter Review Committee, led by Professor Fred Moss (English, Waukesha), started its work by inviting the faculty, staff, and students to communicate their ideas for the new constitution to the group by mid-December 1974. While awaiting this deadline, the Committee members met with Legal Counsel Tallman and System Administrators, who explained the legal requirements of the Faculty Personnel Rules.^[48] The Committee also gathered constitutions from other UW institutions to use as guides. The Committee met several times between semesters to draft a new constitution.

Moss gave the Collegium a progress report in March 1975. On the central issue, he said that the academic departments would be given primary authority over personnel decisions, but that they would be required to consult with local committees to appoint, promote, and tenure faculty. Moss explained that this resolution of the functional equivalent issue appeared best suited to win approval from the System lawyers, who would review the Constitution before it was forwarded to the Board of Regents. Moss also told the senators that most of Chapters 4 and 5, dealing with Academic Departments and Appointments and Promotions, respectively, had been taken word-for-word from the Faculty Personnel Rules. Having completed its work, the Charter Review Committee sent a proposed Constitution to the Center System Collegium in mid-April 1975.

During its April session, the Collegium voted to initiate the Constitution as an amendment to the Charter, and sent it to the 14 local collegia for discussion and a vote by October 1, 1975. The Collegium also decided to conduct a faculty-only advisory referendum before the academic year ended. In this referendum, seventy-one percent of the faculty approved the Constitution.

When the Collegium met in October, the Steering Committee Chair reported that ten Centers had approved the Constitution, which cleared the way for its final test--a two-thirds vote of the Collegium. After several hours of heated debate, the Collegium fell two votes short of the required two-thirds, supporting the Constitution by only a 13 to 8 margin. This result caused consternation practically everywhere, except at the former WSU branch campuses (Barron, Fond du Lac, Medford, Richland), which had led the campaign against it. The Waukesha Center urged Chancellor Fort to simply bypass the Collegium and to take the document directly to the Board of Regents, noting that the faculty had overwhelmingly approved the Constitution and that the votes of the student and academic staff senators had defeated it. System Vice President Donald Smith, too, was upset at this development because only the Center System lacked a constitution that implemented the Faculty Personnel Rules. Smith directed Fort to communicate the urgency of breaking the impasse to all Center System personnel. In special meetings with the Steering Committee, Fort explored the possibility of sending forward just crucial Chapters 4 and 5, on the premise that these had been approved by more than two-thirds of the faculty. This would bring the Centers into compliance with the Faculty Personnel Rules. However, the Steering Committee, after broad consultation via telephone, decided against a piecemeal approach and called a special session of the Collegium, on November 22, to take another vote.

This meeting, held at UWC-Waukesha, was tense from beginning to end. Each faction reiterated its position. The faculty senators from the ten campuses which had approved the Constitution warned of dire consequences, should the Center System again fail to come into compliance with the Faculty Personnel rules. The faculty senators from the opposing four Centers repeated an appeal to leave the locus of power on the campuses. The two academic staff senators again expressed their dismay over the loss of voting rights under the Constitution. The five student senators explained that it was this point, primarily, that had caused them to vote en masse against the Constitution. Although they would retain voting rights, they were sympathetic to the plight of the academic staff. After almost six hours of emotional debate, the crucial roll call vote began. Of course, everyone kept a tally as the names were called. When the 20th name--that of Professor Victor Wrigley of Waukesha--was called and he loudly voted "aye," cheering erupted because his was the decisive vote in favor of ratification. After several minutes of celebration, the remaining two names were called and the final count, 16 in favor and 6 opposed, was announced. Richland Senator Jerry Bower and two student senators had changed their votes, compared to the October Collegium meeting, to put the Constitution over the top. The Board of Regents approved the Constitution in February 1976 and ruled it would take effect July 1, 1976.^[49]

While a few of the constitutional changes were primarily cosmetic--such as naming the systemwide deliberative body the "Senate," while the local governance body continued to be the Collegium--most were quite dramatic. Representation in the Senate would now be proportional to the number of ranked faculty at each Center, with the result that Marathon had two senators and Waukesha three.^[50] Many observed that if this democratic feature had been present in Long's Charter, the arduous struggle over ratification of the Constitution would not have occurred. The student senators, to be selected by the council of student government presidents, were reduced in number from five to three. The two academic staff senators lost their voting rights, although they could participate in Senate debate and serve on Senate committees.^[51] Two new Senate committees were created. The Budget Committee, which almost everyone felt was needed, would consult with and advise the Chancellor on the annual budget and serve as an academic planning council. The other new committee, the Faculty Consultative Committee, would not be staffed by senators; instead each Center collegium would choose one ranked faculty member to serve. The Faculty Consultative Committee had just two duties: first, to determine the form of seniority to be used if tenured faculty layoffs became necessary and, second, to consult with the Chancellor, should a declaration of fiscal emergency be under consideration.^[52]

The most significant changes in faculty governance were spelled out in Chapter 4--Academic Departments and Chapter 5--Appointments and Promotions of Ranked Faculty. Totally erasing former Chancellor Long's antipathy toward the academic departments, the Constitution gave them the primary responsibility for all personnel decisions. In short, no appointment, promotion in rank, or grant of tenure could be made without the appropriate department's approval. While each Center continued to have a local appointments and evaluation committee, it could make no decisions independent of the departments.^[53] In conjunction with this enhancement of the academic departments' authority, Chancellor Fort agreed to the separation of several large departments thrown together by Long. Thus, English was separated from Philosophy, Psychology from Anthropology and Sociology, and Art from Music.^[54] Finally, the Constitution referred to department "chairpersons" in recognition of an ongoing effort to eradicate sexist language from the UW institutions.

Aside from the dramatic changes in the local appointments and evaluation committees' functions, the Constitution specified only a few modest alterations in the local collegium procedures. While Long's Charter had bestowed the right to participate in governance upon all faculty and academic staff who held at least a half-time appointment, the Constitution restricted that right to the ranked faculty. Academic staff persons who wished to have a vote in local affairs now would have to petition the Senate to be granted "faculty status for purposes of governance."^[55] The faculty senators routinely bestowed faculty status upon members of the instructional academic staff because they were employed with the departments' approval, but they grappled for years to establish the criteria for granting faculty status to members of the non-instructional academic staff. Later, in 1985, a Board of Regents policy--The Role of Academic Staff in Governance--spelled out the eligibility of academic staff persons to participate in governance, thus removing the issue from the hands of the faculty.^[56]
The local collegium continued to have student representatives and the local committee that budgeted the student activity fees would have a Regent-mandated student majority.^[57]

Because attracting more students clearly was the surest way for the Center System to solve its financial problems, the Center System Office of Research conducted two major surveys to determine how the Centers could better market themselves. Herman Kroll's "A Survey of Student Opinion, 1975-1976" produced a profile of that year's student body: almost half of the enrollees were women (49%), the median age was 20, one-fourth were non-traditional students (over age 24), 26% were married, 60% lived with their parents, and 64% were employed. Kroll observed that the vast majority of married students were women and that they often were part-time students, so that they could handle both academic and family responsibilities.^[58] When Kroll asked about the reasons for attending a Center, the students reiterated the responses of previous generations: lower cost, smaller classes, good teachers, and the opportunity to try out college in a supportive atmosphere. The respondents listed the major drawbacks as a "high schoolish" atmosphere and a lack of diversity, because most of the students lived in the immediate area.^[59] When Kroll inquired about the students' "Feelings About the Institution," the vast majority gave the Center a very high rating. In particular, they felt they had been treated as adults and that the professors were interested in them as individuals. Students at the smaller Centers rated their experience more positively than did colleagues at the larger ones, no doubt because it was easier to become acquainted.^[60]

In October 1976, Teresa Shen, Richard Schwartz, and Beverly Drier released "The UW-Center System Transfer Study," which surveyed a stratified random sample of just over one thousand students who had been enrolled in a Center in the fall of 1973 to learn their circumstances three years later. The study revealed that 60% of the respondents had continued their education, with 78% of them transferring to a UW four-year campus. The most popular transfer institutions were Madison (29%), Milwaukee (18%) and Oshkosh (13%). Center System transferees earned just slightly better grades at their new college, which confirmed the assertion that the Center System prepared its students well for junior and senior level courses.^[61] While neither of the studies contained any startling new information, both underscored the Centers' claim that they provided access to the University of Wisconsin for many persons who, otherwise, would not have had an opportunity to enroll. This was especially true for older and married students, who were more place-bound than recent high school graduates.

Ironically, while the smaller Centers struggled to attract more students to fill up under-utilized classrooms and laboratories, several of the larger Centers needed more space to handle their burgeoning enrollments. Many of the campuses constructed in the 1960s had been minimally outfitted and now facilities were overtaxed. A 1975-1976 survey revealed that five campuses lacked a gymnasium, six had no theater or performing arts area, numerous libraries were cramped, most Centers were without a student union or commons area where students could gather, and three Centers needed more classrooms and laboratories.^[62] Three Centers--Fox Valley, Washington County, Waukesha--had experienced enrollment growth far beyond the original estimates. For example, Waukesha juggled the schedules of 1,200 students on a campus designed for 750. ^[63]

The unique arrangement between a Center's host community, which built and maintained the facilities, and the Board of Regents, which supplied the moveable equipment and paid the faculty and staff, meant building projects in the Center System took a long time to negotiate. At Fox Valley and Washington County such negotiations were even more complicated. Fox Valley was sponsored by Outagamie and Winnebago Counties, who had split the initial bond issue 50/50. However, Winnebago County resisted continuing this pact because two-thirds of the Fox Valley students now resided in Outagamie County. The presence of UW-Oshkosh in Winnebago County, which competed for students with the Center, further complicated the negotiations. During the protracted dispute between the two counties, the Appleton Post-Crescent accused UW-Oshkosh faculty of orchestrating opposition to a settlement.^[64]

In Washington County there were different antagonists. Here, the City of West Bend had shared the cost of erecting a new campus in the late 1960s with Washington County, on a 40%/60% basis. Now with the buildings crammed with 150 students above their capacity, the city sought to reduce its share to twenty percent. Naturally, the County Board resisted. After two years of argument, Reuben Schmahl, the County Board Chairman, wrote to Governor Martin Schreiber to urge the state to assume responsibility for all of the Center System facilities. Coached by Center System administrators, the Governor's reply reminded Schmahl that his county had won a spirited competition to host a Center; a competition it had eagerly entered because of the educational, cultural, and economic advantages that would accrue to the community. Schreiber warned that if the state secured ownership of the Washington County campus, it could be closed without any input from the County Board or Board of Regents. The governor therefore urged Schmahl and his fellow supervisors to continue to seek a solution to the impasse.^[65]

Among the many items included in the merger implementation statute was a directive that the Board of Regents assure that all UW System faculty and academic staff with comparable training, experience, and responsibility receive equitable compensation. The 1975 state budget bill repeated this mandate and set up a Legislative Study Committee to investigate salary equity, ". . . paying particular attention to salaries provided in the Center System."^[66] Subsequently, the Legislative Committee asked the Board of Regents to supply it with data on UW System salaries and an explanation of any apparent inequities. This request, as usual, was passed on to each institution. Thus, in November 1976, the Center System Senate created a four member Faculty Salary Equity Committee to conduct an investigation. UW System Administration directed the Committee to first determine whether there were any internal salary inequalities among the fourteen Centers before comparing the Centers' salaries to those of the University Cluster campuses.[^[67]

The Faculty Salary Equity Committee uncovered great salary inequities among the campuses. The Committee concluded that external factors had created these differences. First, it noted that the Center System had three “parents”–UW-Madison (7 Centers), the former Wisconsin State Universities (4 branch campuses), and UW-Green Bay (the 3-M Centers)–which had treated their two-year campus faculties quite differently. Second, just prior to merger, the legislature had handsomely boosted the salaries of the State University system’s personnel, with the result that faculty at Barron County, Fond du Lac, Medford, and Richland received raises that put them ahead of their Chapter 36 colleagues. Third, the rapid inflation of recent years had so eroded purchasing power that the Center System had been compelled to increase starting salaries to attract new faculty.

This policy had produced a new problem–a few of the new hirees’ salaries topped those of some veteran faculty members. This salary compression naturally struck hard at morale. The Committee made two recommendations, to be implemented over two academic years, to correct the internal inequities it had uncovered. First, it recommended that the injustices created by the different starting salaries for the past four years, 1973 through 1977, be corrected, at a cost of $20,000. Second, the Salary Equity Committee urged that all other faculty salaries be adjusted to remove the inequalities between campuses. Under this proposal, which would require $245,000 to implement, the Barron County faculty would receive no equity increase, while the other Centers’ faculty would receive boosts ranging from 2.5% at Fond du Lac to 7.6% at Baraboo.^[68]

With these recommendations, the Faculty Salary Equity Committee had completed the first portion of its task. It then began comparing the Centers’ faculty salaries with those in the University Cluster and urged Chancellor Fort to request that System Administration conduct a similar study. The committee members noted that they lacked the time to do a detailed study of academic staff compensation and they asked the Senate to set up a separate committee to investigate those salaries. The Senate quickly acceded to this request.^[69]

On July 1, 1977, the reins of leadership were passed to different hands at both ends of State Street. University of Wisconsin System President John Weaver, who had announced his intention to retire the previous July, left his post to become a Visiting Distinguished Professor at the University of Southern California. The Board of Regents’ search for Weaver’s successor resulted in the selection of UW-Madison’s Chancellor H. Edwin Young as the University’s sixteenth president. Young, who had first arrived in Madison in 1947 as an economics instructor, had led the Madison campus for nine years. He had enjoyed strong support from the Regents because he had dealt effectively with student demonstrators. The only negative comment on Young’s appointment came from TAUWF (The Association of University of Wisconsin Faculties), which claimed its membership primarily among the former Wisconsin State Universities’ faculty. TAUWF believed the selection of Madison’s chief executive to head the System meant that the interests of the out-state campuses would be ignored.^[70]

The transition at the state capitol was equally smooth. When Governor Lucey resigned to become President Jimmy Carter’s ambassador to Mexico, his lieutenant governor, Martin J. Schreiber, succeeded him. Schreiber had been second-in-command since 1971 and before that he had served two terms in the state Senate.^[71]

The 1978 governor’s election proved to be extremely interesting from the University’s standpoint. On the Republican side, UW-Stevens Point Chancellor Lee S. Dreyfus surprised the political pundits when he announced, in April 1978, that he was resigning his post to seek the Republican gubernatorial nomination. A political neophyte, who had not previously even announced his political affiliation, Dreyfus brought to his campaign great skill as a public speaker and trademark red vests. Despite Dreyfus’s impassioned plea to remain neutral in the primary, the Republican state convention endorsed U.S. Representative Robert Kasten. Undaunted, Dreyfus fought on and scored a smashing upset in the September primary. The Democrats, meanwhile, had a much less controversial convention and primary. Although challenged by Madison businessman David Carley for the top spot on the ticket, Governor Schreiber easily defeated Carley in the primary.^[72]

The Dreyfus/Schreiber campaign brought forth two issues directly related to Wisconsin higher education. The candidates devoted a good deal of time describing how they would dispose of a totally unexpected $300 to $500 million budget surplus. Dreyfus, naturally, blamed Democrats’ overtaxation for the surplus and promised to return it to the taxpayers, perhaps through a two or three month income tax withholding moratorium. Schreiber, who insisted that the surplus resulted from inflation-related “tax bracket creep,” proposed to dispose of it through program spending, targeted to critical needs. The governor suggested some spending to increase salaries for UW and other state employees, whose purchasing power had been severely diminished by inflation The second issue concerned the financing of the state’s vocation-technical education system, which Dreyfus proposed to shift from local property taxes to state government. The vocational-technical schools’ supporters strongly backed Schreiber’s attack on Dreyfus’s scheme. They feared that such a tax shift would lead directly to more state control over the Voc-Tech System and, perhaps, even to demands that some districts reduce their cost per student to a statewide average, just as the Center System was being pressured to do.

Dreyfus, the political newcomer, rapidly overcame Schreiber’s early lead with populist-style campaign techniques drawn from his earlier career as a UW-Madison professor of speech. By contrast, Schreiber appeared ill at ease and displayed occasional flashes of temper in dealing with the press corps. Dreyfus’s lead continued to build throughout the early fall and the question soon became whether his coat tails would be long enough to give the Republicans control of at least one chamber of the legislature. On election day, Dreyfus handily defeated Schreiber, 816,000 to 674,000, but the Democrats maintained their comfortable margins in both the Senate and Assembly.^[73]

Many in the University speculated about how a governor, who had been a faculty member and a top administrator, might treat the UW. Of course, because Dreyfus inherited higher education policies from his predecessor, there probably would not be any immediate, dramatic change of direction proposed for the 1979-1981 biennial budget. When queried about what he might do about the underutilized Center System campuses, Governor-elect Dreyfus said, perhaps they could be used for Department of Natural Resources regional offices. He argued that this use of the facilities would cushion the negative economic impacts of closing a Center, because the state would pay rent and the DNR would employ secretaries and other support staff. Dreyfus also noted that such an arrangement would make the DNR personnel more accessible to the public.

Although Dreyfus did not name a specific campus in his comments, reporters speculated that Medford and Richland were the most likely candidates for conversion to DNR use. When contacted for his reaction, Chancellor Fort bluntly labelled the suggestion “nonsensical” and “ridiculous” and noted that the governor would need the Democrat legislature’s approval before any Center could be shut down. President Young was more measured in his response. Young thought that Dreyfus had just been thinking out loud and that the only valid reason for closing a Center would be if it consistently failed to achieve its enrollment and cost-per-student targets. He went on to explain that the Centers were important points of access to the UW for many citizens. He also reminded reporters of his September testimony before the Assembly Education Committee, in which he had observed that Center System’s CSI now was comparable to that of the baccalaureate institutions. DNR top officials, who were definitely against the governor-elect’s idea, were convinced that dispersing even a portion of their personnel to the hinterlands would reduce, not increase, the agency’s efficiency.^[74]