Ch. 1.3. Primary Source: Antifederalists; Brutus I, Oct., 1787
Brutus I, Oct. 18, 1787
The author writing under the pseudonym of Brutus attacks the excessive powers that he feels the proposed central government will have, focusing especially on the necessary and proper clause, the supremacy clause, and the taxing power, and more briefly on the judicial branch. The essay ends with a vigorous defense of the traditional idea, as expressed by Montesquieu, that free republics are feasible only in small territories. One of Madison’s most famous essays, Federalist no. 10 (see below), seems to respond directly to Brutus’s points. Text from Teaching American History.org, at Brutus I.
To the Citizens of the State of New York.
Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their political concerns. We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these United States are held together, and the want of sufficient energy in our present confederation, to manage, in some instances, our general concerns… Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have succeeded. At length a Convention of the states has been assembled, they have formed a constitution which will now, probably, be submitted to the people to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power…
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the best for the United States or not? … This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.
This government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 8, article I [C1.8.18], it is declared “that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States; or in any department or office thereof.” And by the 6th article [C6.2], it is declared “that this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution, or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”
It appears from these articles that there is no need of any intervention of the state governments between the Congress and the people to execute any one power vested in the general government… The government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as much one complete government as that of New York or Massachusetts, has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws… with respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world. So far therefore as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is still left to the states, but… all that is reserved for the individual states must very soon be annihilated…
The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises [C1.8.1]. There is no limitation to this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which those taxes, and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation; but this is no restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States… This power therefore is neither more nor less, than a power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure…
The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish [C3.1]. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution [C3.2]… These courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts…, and… it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective states…
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? … If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting… the baron de Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]: “It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist… In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected.” …
History furnishes no example of a free republic anything like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.
Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic… In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble… In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives…
Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government. The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business? It certainly is not.
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar… The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them… But in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large would know little of their proceedings… In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them…