Ch. 1.4. Primary Source: Antifederalists; Brutus III, Nov., 1787
Brutus III, Nov. 15, 1787
Along with arguing against the feasibility of a single, consolidated government over the United States, here Brutus continues his argument that the legislative branch will not be sufficiently representative of the people. Among other things, he criticizes the three-fifths and slave-trade clauses. Text from Teaching American History.org, at Brutus III.
To the Citizens of the State of New York.
In the investigation of the constitution, under your consideration…, it has been my object to turn your attention to the principal defects in this system.
I have attempted to show that a consolidation of this extensive continent, under one government, for internal, as well as external purposes, which is evidently the tendency of this constitution, cannot succeed, without a sacrifice of your liberties; and therefore that the attempt is not only preposterous, but extremely dangerous; and I have shown, independent of this, that the plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle, which ought to be found in every free government; to wit, a declaration of rights…
The first important object that presents itself in the organization of this government, is the legislature. This is to be composed of two branches; the first to be called the general assembly [i.e., the House of Representatives], and is to be chosen by the people of the respective states, in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, and is to consist of sixty five members, with powers in the legislature to increase the number, not to exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants [C1.2.3]. The second branch is to be called the Senate, and is to consist of twenty-six members, two of which are to be chosen by the legislatures of each of the states [C1.3.1]…
In the former of these there is an appearance of justice…, [but] it will be found that there is really no equality of representation, even in this house. The words are “representatives and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several states, which may be included in this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons” [C1.2.3].
What a strange and unnecessary accumulation of words are here used to conceal from the public eye, what might have been expressed in the following concise manner: “Representatives are to be proportioned among the states respectively, according to the number of freemen and slaves inhabiting them, counting five slaves for three free men.”
“In a free state,” says the celebrated Montesquieu, “every man who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government. Therefore the legislature should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.” But it has never been alleged that those who are not free agents, can, upon any rational principle, have anything to do in government, either by themselves or others.
If they have no share in government, why is the number of members in the assembly, to be increased on their account? Is it because in some of the states, a considerable part of the property of the inhabitants consists in a number of their fellow men, who are held in bondage, in defiance of every idea of benevolence, justice, and religion, and contrary to all the principles of liberty, which have been publicly avowed in the late glorious revolution? If this be a just ground for representation, the horses in some of the states, and the oxen in others, ought to be represented—for a great share of property in some of them consists in these animals; and they have as much control over their own actions, as these poor unhappy creatures, who are intended to be described in the above recited clause, by the words, “all other persons.”
By this mode of apportionment, the representatives of the different parts of the union, will be extremely unequal: in some of the southern states, the slaves are nearly equal in number to the freemen; and for all these slaves, they will be entitled to a proportionate share in the legislature—this will give them an unreasonable weight in the government, which can derive no additional strength, protection, nor defence from the slaves, but the contrary. Why then should they be represented?
What adds to the evil is, that these states are to be permitted to continue the inhuman traffic of importing slaves, until the year 1808 [C1.9.1]—and for every cargo of these unhappy people, which unfeeling unprincipled, barbarous, and avaricious wretches, may tear from their country, friends and tender connections, and bring into those states, they are to be rewarded by having an increase of members in the general assembly.
There appears at the first view a manifest inconsistency, in the apportionment of representatives in the Senate, upon the plan of a consolidated government [C1.3.1]. On every principle of equity, and propriety, representation in a government should be in exact proportion to the numbers, or the aids afforded by the persons represented. How unreasonable, and unjust then is it, that Delaware should have a representation in the senate, equal to Massachusetts, or Virginia? The latter of which contains ten times her numbers, and is to contribute to the aid of the general government in that proportion? This article of the constitution will appear the more objectionable, if it is considered, that the powers vested in this branch of the legislature are very extensive, and greatly surpass those lodged in the assembly…
The very term, representative, implies, that the person or body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them—a representation of the people of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people… In this respect, the new constitution is radically defective. The house of assembly, which is intended as a representation of the people of America, will not, nor cannot, in the nature of things, be a proper one—sixty-five men cannot be found in the United States, who hold the sentiments, possess the feelings, or are acquainted with the wants and interests of this vast country…
According to the common course of human affairs, the natural aristocracy of the country will be elected. Wealth always creates influence, and this is generally much increased by large family connections: this class in society will forever have a great number of dependents; besides, they will always favor each other—it is their interest to combine—they will therefore constantly unite their efforts to procure men of their own rank to be elected…
It is probable, that but few of the merchants, and those the most opulent and ambitious, will have a representation from their body… The great body of the yeomen [i.e., small farmers] of the country cannot expect any of their order in this assembly— the station will be too elevated for them to aspire to—the distance between the people and their representatives, will be so very great, that there is no probability that a farmer, however respectable, will be chosen. The mechanics of every branch [i.e., artisans], must expect to be excluded from a seat in this body— It will and must be esteemed a station too high and exalted to be filled by any but the first men in the state, in point of fortune; so that in reality there will be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic.—The well born, and highest orders in life, as they term themselves, will be ignorant of the sentiments of the middling class of citizens…
It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the many. You may conclude with a great degree of certainty, that it, like all others of a similar nature, will be managed by influence and corruption… The more I reflect on this subject, the more firmly am I persuaded, that the representation is merely nominal—a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence.
No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number. The British house of commons consists of five hundred and fifty-eight members; the number of inhabitants in Great-Britain, is computed at eight millions—this gives one member for a little more than fourteen thousand…