Ch. 1.2. Primary Source: Antifederalists; George Mason, Sept., 1787

One of the earliest statements of what became known as “antifederalist” criticisms of the Constitution was made at the Philadelphia Convention itself by the delegate George Mason, the well known author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. He spoke out against the proposed Constitution on Sept. 13, just four days before the Convention ended.

Mason’s long list of the Constitution’s defects includes the lack of a Bill of Rights, insufficient representation in the legislative branch, an overly powerful Senate and federal judiciary, and a lack of checks on the power of the president. He also maintains that several specific provisions concerning Congress either give it excessive power, such as the commerce and necessary and proper clauses (C1.8.3, 1.8.18), or unduly limit its authority, such as the prohibitions on ending the slave trade (C1.9.1) and on raising taxes on exports (C1.9.5).

This text is a summary of his speech that became widely available after Nov. 22, 1787, when it was published (by an author known as “Brutus”) as part of the debates that raged in newspaper editorials in New York.

There is no declaration of rights; and, the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights in the separate states are no security…

In the House of Representatives there is not the substance, but the shadow only, of representation, which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people. The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with, their effects and consequences.

The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with the President of the United States, although they are not the representatives of the people, or amenable to them. These, with their other great powers, (viz., their powers in the appointment of ambassadors, and all public officers, in making treaties, and in trying all impeachments;) their influence upon, and connection with, the supreme executive from these causes; their duration of office; and their being a constant existing body… will destroy any balance in the government…

The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.

The President of the United States has no constitutional council… He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites…; or a council of state will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments… Whereas, had a constitutional council been formed (as was proposed) of six members, viz., two from the Eastern, two from the Middle, and two from the Southern States, to be appointed by vote of the states in the House of Representatives, with the same duration and rotation of office as the Senate, the executive would always have had safe and proper information and advice…

From this fatal defect of a constitutional council has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of the public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature and the supreme executive. Hence, also, sprang that unnecessary officer, the Vice-President, who, for want of other employment, is made president of the Senate; thereby dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one of the states an unnecessary and unjust preeminence over the others.

The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardon for treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt. By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the executive and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation, which might have been avoided, by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be done with safety.

By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws [C1.8.3], the five Southern States (whose produce and circumstances are totally different from those of the eight Northern and Eastern States) will be ruined; for such rigid and premature regulations may be made, as will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities, at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of the landed interest, and the impoverishment of the people… Whereas, requiring two thirds of the members present in both houses, would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the general interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the adoption of the government.

Under their own construction of the general clause at the end of the enumerated powers [C1.8.18], the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their power as far as they shall think proper; so that the state legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights. There is no declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by jury in civil cases, nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace.

The state legislatures are restrained from laying export duties on their own produce [C1.10.2]; the general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty-odd years [C1.9.1], though such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence…

This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy: it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.

Source: Teaching American History.org, at Objections to the Constitution: George Mason.